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It is common in repeated measurements for extreme values at the first measurement to
approach the mean at the subsequent measurement, a phenomenon called regression
to the mean (RTM). If RTM is not fully controlled, it will lead to erroneous conclusions.
The wide use of repeated measurements in social psychology creates a risk that an
RTM effect will influence results. However, insufficient attention is paid to RTM in most
social psychological research. Notable cases include studies on the phenomena of social
conformity and unrealistic optimism (Klucharev et al., 2009, 2011; Sharot et al., 2011,
2012b; Campbell-Meiklejohn et al., 2012; Kim et al., 2012; Garrett and Sharot, 2014). In
Study 1, 13 university students rated and re-rated the facial attractiveness of a series of
female faces as a test of the social conformity effect (Klucharev et al., 2009). In Study
2, 15 university students estimated and re-estimated their risk of experiencing a series
of adverse life events as a test of the unrealistic optimism effect (Sharot et al., 2011).
Although these studies used methodologies similar to those used in earlier research, the
social conformity and unrealistic optimism effects were no longer evident after controlling
for RTM. Based on these findings we suggest several ways to control for the RTM effect
in social psychology studies, such as adding the initial rating as a covariate in regression
analysis, selecting a subset of stimuli for which the participant’ initial ratings were matched
across experimental conditions, and using a control group.
Keywords: regression to the mean, repeated measurements, social conformity, unrealistic optimism, social
psychology
INTRODUCTION
Researchers often make repeated measurements on unstable vari-
ables to obtain more accurate data or to assess change. However,
measurements vary from one time point to the next due to ran-
dom error, and extreme values at the first measurement tend
to approach the mean at the subsequent measurement. This is
known as “regression to the mean” (RTM) (Galton, 1886). The
measurement of blood pressure serves as a good example. If blood
pressure is initially measured in a group of patients and then
re-measured after a period of time, people with extreme blood
pressure at Time 1 will tend to be closer to the average level at
Time 2, due to random error. RTMmay be a possible explanation
for the observed change since it can make natural variation seem
like real change (Barnett et al., 2005). In medicine, a placebo con-
trol group in a controlled trial is usually introduced to remove the
effect of RTM. People usually seek treatment when their symp-
toms are particularly severe. If treatment is sought when these
symptoms are at their worst, these symptoms should be less severe
simply by random fluctuations and natural recovery, even when
no treatment is used (See Figure 1A). Thus, any treatment intro-
duced when the symptoms are most severe will almost always
lead to a coincidental recovery, even if the treatment has no
effectiveness whatsoever. The placebo group which uses an inert
treatment also experiences a tendency to regress to the mean. If
the treatment group shows a statistically significant increase in
the speed that symptoms regress, then it can be attributed to the
effects of the treatment, not the placebo effect or RTM. Similarly,
if a large group of students is given a test of some sort and the
top-performing 10% students are selected, these people would
be likely to score worse, on average, if re-tested. This is because
their performance in a single test reflects individuals’ true skill
plus some luck rather than their normal level ability in most cir-
cumstances. Similarly, the bottom 10% would be likely to score
better on a retest. In either case, the extremes of the distribution
are likely to regress toward themean due to natural random varia-
tion in the results and simple luck (you would not always be lucky
or unlucky). In research, an important consequence is that exper-
imental effects can be misleading. This has been recognized by
many clinical researchers as treatments that appear to be effica-
cious may not show evidence of efficacy once RTM is controlled
(Whitney and Von Korff, 1992; Cummings et al., 2000; Morton
and Torgerson, 2003).
The wide use of repeated measurements in social psychology
creates a risk that an RTM effect will influence results. However,
insufficient attention is paid to RTM in most social psycholog-
ical research. Notable cases include studies on the phenomena
of social conformity and unrealistic optimism (Klucharev et al.,
2009, 2011; Sharot et al., 2011, 2012b; Campbell-Meiklejohn
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FIGURE 1 | Regression to the mean effect and ways to control for it. (A) A graphic illustration of regression to the mean (RTM) effect. (B) Three ways to
control for the RTM effect.
et al., 2012; Kim et al., 2012; Garrett and Sharot, 2014). Social con-
formity refers to people habitually conforming to group behavior
when making decisions and judgments (Asch, 1951; Festinger,
1954; Cialdini and Goldstein, 2004; Campbell-Meiklejohn et al.,
2010); unrealistic optimism describes the tendency of people to
overestimate the likelihood of future positive events and under-
estimate that of future negative events (Weinstein, 1980; Taylor
and Brown, 1988; Armor and Taylor, 2002; Puri and Robinson,
2007; Carver et al., 2010). In recent years, studies using repeated
measurements have documented both types of effects. In those
studies, researchers examined social conformity by asking par-
ticipants to rate the attractiveness of faces and then providing
information about the group rating (challenging information)
before the participants rated the faces a second time (Klucharev
et al., 2009; Kim et al., 2012). In studies on the unrealistic
optimism effect, participants were instructed to estimate the like-
lihood of experiencing adverse events and were then presented
with the average probability of each event (challenging informa-
tion) before again making likelihood estimation (Sharot et al.,
2011, 2012b; Garrett and Sharot, 2014). In most of these studies,
RTM was not recognized and taken into account in comparisons
of Time 1 and Time 2 responses.
In fact, the lack of control for RTM in recent research on
social conformity and unrealistic optimism is very likely to have
affected the results and conclusions of these studies. In the above-
cited studies on social conformity (Klucharev et al., 2009; Kim
et al., 2012), participants rated facial attractiveness on an eight-
or nine-point scale and the group rating that served as feedback
was assigned to be above or below the participants’ rating by
1, 2, or 3 points. Finally, researchers examined the social con-
formity effect by applying One-Way repeated measures ANOVA
(with conflict between participants’ initial rating and group rating
as the within-subject factor: 0, ±1; ±2; and changes between the
initial rating and re-rating as the dependent variable). However,
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as the feedback algorithm was constrained, faces with high initial
ratings given by participants were likely to be assigned to the peer-
lower condition (group rating was lower than participants’ rating)
and faces with low initial ratings given by participants were likely
to be assigned to the peer-higher condition (group rating was
higher than participants’ rating) (Huang et al., 2014). This means
that later, in the re-rating session, high initial ratings in the peer-
lower condition as well as low initial ratings in the peer-higher
condition might have tended to approach the average. Thus, the
apparent social conformity effect may have been influenced by
RTM. In the Klucharev et al. (2009) study the researchers did in
fact test for the RTM effect by comparing the variances of rat-
ings given by participants with either a central or a more extreme
response tendency. This was an important step in recognizing the
influence of RTM in social psychological research. However, this
approach does not fully control for the RTM effect, as extreme
ratings at the initial rating session may still regress to the mean at
the re-rating session.
Recent studies on unrealistic optimism (Sharot et al., 2011,
2012b; Garrett and Sharot, 2014) also are problematic. Although
the research designs in these studies made RTM likely, RTM
was not assessed or controlled for. In these studies, participants
were asked to make estimations of adverse life events. To make
the range of possible underestimation equal to that of possible
overestimation, participants were told that the range of average
probabilities (presented as challenging information) was between
3% and 77% while it actually lay between 10% and 70%. As
a consequence, events with a high estimation were more likely
to be assigned to the desirable information condition (average
probability was lower than participants’ rating) and events with
a low estimation were more likely to be assigned to the undesir-
able information condition (average probability was higher than
participants’ rating). In this paradigm, extreme estimation in the
initial session might be followed by an estimation closer to the
mean at follow-up, meaning that RTM may have affected the
unrealistic optimism effect in these studies.
In order to test if the RTM effect can confound these com-
monly cited social psychological findings, we conducted two
studies using paradigms similar to those used to test the social
conformity effect (Klucharev et al., 2009) and the unrealistic opti-
mism effect (Sharot et al., 2011) in earlier research. The main
difference was that participants were aware that group average
rating or average probability existed, but they were given no
information about these averages. Here, we used the “proof by
contradiction” method to examine the effect of RTM, similar to
the demonstration that statistics that were uncorrected for mul-
tiple comparisons showed active voxel clusters in the salmon’s
brain when the dead salmon was scanned using functional mag-
netic resonance imaging (fMRI) during a social perspective taking
task (Bennett et al., 2009). Proof by contradiction is often used
when researchers wish to prove the impossibility of something.
Researchers assume it is possible, and then reach a contradic-
tion. In the “dead salmon” example, the contradiction researchers
arrive at is that “dead salmon”s brain was activated during a social
task’, which is obviously untrue. It proves that the statistical anal-
ysis methods used in that fMRI study is invalid. In our study,
we deliberately withheld social feedback information so that no
psychological effects should be found. This design is important
for the present studies, because the absence of challenging infor-
mation means that participants’ ratings or estimations would
not be influenced by experimental conditions and any change in
ratings or estimations could be attributable to RTM.We first ana-
lyzed the data according to the methods used in recent studies
and then analyzed it again after controlling for the RTM effect.
We assumed that the RTM effect would be evident and confound
the social conformity and unrealistic optimism effects even with-
out the impact of challenging information, and we hypothesized
that the social conformity and unrealistic optimism effects would
not be found after RTM was controlled.
STUDY 1: SOCIAL CONFORMITY
PARTICIPANTS
We recruited 13 healthy participants from South China Normal
University (n = 13, four males, mean age ± SD, 21.15 ± 2.64
years). All participants were right-handed and had normal or
corrected-to-normal vision and no neurological or psychiatric
disorders. Written, informed consent was given by all partic-
ipants and they were entitled to discontinue participation at
any time. All participants were paid 30 yuan (about $5 U.S.)
for their participation. The study was approved by the Ethics
Committee of the School of Psychology at South China Normal
University.
EXPERIMENTAL PARADIGM
We used 280 digital photos of young adult Chinese females
(Huang et al., 2014) as stimuli. Participants were informed that
they were participating in a research project studying human per-
ception of facial attractiveness. First, one of the 280 photographs
of female faces was presented for 2 s. Then we instructed partici-
pants to use the mouse to rate the face on a 1 (very unattractive)
to 8 (very attractive) scale in 4 s, and the number they had chosen
was highlighted by a blue box for 0.5 s. Then, in order to create an
experimental context similar to the Klucharev et al. (2009) study
and to make participants believe that they were informed of the
group rating even though they were not, participants were told
that the group rating (calculated based on 200 other students of
the same gender) would be displayed within a black box for 2 s but
they would not be able to see it (Figure 2A). Although this phase
is labeled as “group feedback” in Figure 2A, only the same initial
rating was shown and no group feedback was actually provided.
The absence of feedback information ensures that participants’
ratings or estimations would not be influenced by experimen-
tal conditions and any change in ratings or estimations could be
attributable to RTM. This manipulation is critical for our “proof
by contradiction” approach as explained above.
There were 280 trials in total. The group rating programmed
in the computer varied across trials. In 70 trials, the group rat-
ing matched the participant’s rating (peers-agree condition). In
105 trials, the group rating was higher than the participant’s rat-
ing by 1, 2, or 3 points (peer-higher condition). In the other
105 trials, the group rating was lower by 1, 2, or 3 points
when compared with the participant’s rating (peer-lower condi-
tion). Presentations of all face stimuli were randomized across
participants and conditions.
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FIGURE 2 | Experimental task design in study 1. (A) In initial rating
session, a photograph of a female face was presented and
participants rated face attractiveness on an eight-point Likert scale.
Then, a blue box confirmed the initial rating. Finally, participants were
told that group rating (calculated based on 200 other students of the
same gender) was displayed within a black box. (B) Thirty minutes
after the initial session, participants rated the same faces again in the
re-rating session.
Thirty minutes after the first behavior session, participants
were required to conduct an unexpected subsequent session
(Figure. 2B). In this session, 280 faces in a new randomized
order were rated by participants again without information about
the peer group rating. Thus, participants rated twice in the
experiment: the first time before the “group rating” phase and
the second time 30min after the first session. After the entire
experiment, participants indicated that they believed there had
been an average group rating shown to them but it was not
visible.
DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
At the beginning of the analysis phase, the ratings of faces in each
session were mean-corrected (Sharot et al., 2012a) so as to con-
trol overall changes in ratings across sessions (Mean-Corrected
Rating = Rating for a Face - Average Rating for all 280 Faces).
We also computed a rating change score for each face (i.e., Mean-
Corrected 30-min Re-rating - Mean-Corrected Initial Rating).
We then used the method of Klucharev et al. (2009) to analyze
the behavioral data. A One-Way ANOVA on rating change scores
with conflict (Group Rating - Participant’s Initial Rating, with
seven possible scores: ±3, ±2, ±1, 0) as a within-subject vari-
able confirmed the significant main effect of conflict [F(6, 12) =
15.009, p < 0.001], consistent with a social conformity effect.
This result suggests that participants tended to align themselves
with the peer-group ratings presented 30min earlier (Figure 3A),
a conclusion that is obvious impossible given that no social feed-
back was actually presented in the first place. This “contradiction”
proves that the statistical analysis methods applied above are
incorrect and the RTM effect needs to be controlled.
In order to control for the RTM effect, we analyzed the behav-
ior data again using method of Zaki et al. (2011). At first, for each
participant, we selected a subset of faces for which the participant’
initial ratings were matched across the peers-lower and peers-
higher conditions (see Figure 1B, left panel). For each participant,
we excluded faces with initial ratings smaller than 7% in the peer-
higher condition and faces with initial ratings larger than 93% in
the peer-lower condition. After the exclusion, there was no signif-
icant difference between participants’ initial rating in peer-higher
and peer-lower condition, t(12) = 0.743, p = 0.472. The average
number of trials for the peers-lower and peers-higher conditions
was 71.46 (SD = 19.97) and 81.62 (SD = 12.61), respectively.
The subsequent analysis only used the matched subsets data. The
paired-samples t test on rating change scores revealed no signifi-
cant difference between peers-lower and peers-higher conditions
for the interval of 30min, t(12) = −0.199, p = 0.845 (Figure 3B).
Finally, regression analysis was conducted with degree of con-
flict as the independent variable and rating change as the depen-
dent variable. Conflict had a significant effect on rating change,
beta = 0.082, p < 0.001. However, when we controlled for the
RTM effect by adding the initial rating as another independent
variable (see Figure 1B, middle panel), the new regression model
showed that conflict no longer significantly predicted the rating
change, beta = 0.005, p = 0.54. Thus, after RTM was controlled
we found no evidence of the social-conformity effect.
STUDY 2: UNREALISTIC OPTIMISM
PARTICIPANTS AND EXPERIMENTAL PARADIGM
To ascertain whether an experimental effect other than social
conformity could be confounded by the RTM effect, we next
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FIGURE 3 | Social conformity effect in study 1. (A) Change in
mean-corrected ratings after 30min (mean-corrected 30-min re-rating
minus the mean-corrected initial rating) as a function of conflict with the
norm (−1, −2, −3 = group ratings were more negative than initial ratings
by 1, 2, 3, points;; 0 = no conflict; +1, +2, +3 = group ratings were
more positive than initial ratings by 1, 2, 3 points). (B) Change in
mean-corrected ratings after 30min as a function of conditions. To control
for regression to the mean, the results were from subsets of faces with
initial ratings matched between the peer-higher and peer-lower conditions.
Error bars indicate standard error.
examined the unrealistic optimism effect in the absence of aver-
age probability. Fifteen healthy, right-handed participants were
recruited via South China Normal University (n = 15, 4 males,
mean age ± SD, 20.93 ± 1.75 years). All participants received a
uniform payment of 30 yuan (about 5 US dollars).
Eighty short descriptions of adverse life events from the study
of Sharot et al. (2011) were used as stimuli, with descriptions tak-
ing into account the Chinese context (see Supplementary List of
Stimuli in Study 2). The stimuli did not include very rare or very
common events, with probabilities ranging from 5% to 80%. In
each trial, one of those 80 negative life events was presented at
random for 2 s. Then an initial value of 55 percent was shown
under “My risk” on the screen’s left side and participants were
asked to estimate the likelihood of experiencing the adverse event
in the future by changing the initial value in 10 s. Participants
were told that the range of probabilities was between 5% and
80%, which was consistent with the actual range of probabili-
ties. This method was slightly different from that used in the
study of Sharot et al. (2011) as no possible overestimation and
underestimation were ensured. However, this method can help
to exclude the influence of extreme estimation due to an arti-
ficially enlarged range of average probability and can facilitate
an accurate test of the experimental effect using this paradigm.
Specifically, we set the initial value of 55 percent so as to make it
convenient for participants to adjust their estimation of experi-
encing adverse events upwards or downwards. Participants could
increase and decrease the tens digit of the initial value by pushing
F and G keys while the J and K keys could be used to control the
units digit. Finally, for 2 s, participants’ estimated risk of the event
was shown under “My risk” while no average probability of that
event occurring to people from a background similar to their own
was presented under “Average risk.” But, to make the experimen-
tal context similar to the study of Sharot et al. (2011) as well as
make participants believe that they were informed of the average
probability, participants were told that the average probability was
presented in black font under “Average risk” and they cannot see
it (Figure 4A). Participants reported at the end of the experiment
that they believed an average probability of each event had been
presented but was invisible.
Unlike in the Sharot et al. (2011) study, in the current study no
accurate average probability for each adverse event could be cal-
culated, even with the use of online resources. Therefore, average
probability in current study was programmed in the computer
using the following criteria: in half the trials, the average risk
was higher than the participant’s estimation by 2 to 21 percent-
age points (undesirable condition) while in the remaining trials
it was below the participant’s estimation by -21 to -2 percentage
points (desirable condition). After 30min, participants took part
in an unexpected subsequent estimation session identical to the
first (Figure 4B).
DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
The mean-corrected estimation for each session was computed as
(Estimation for an Event - Average Estimation for all 80 Events)
and update of each event was computed as (Mean-Corrected 30-
min Re-estimation -Mean-Corrected Initial Estimation).We then
analyzed the behavioral data with the methods used by Sharot
et al. (2011), comparing the absolute update (|Mean-Corrected
30-min Re-estimation - Mean-Corrected Initial Estimation|) in
the desirable vs. undesirable condition through paired-samples
t test. The results showed that there was a significant difference
between the absolute updates seen in the desirable condition
and undesirable conditions t(14) = 2.037, p = 0.061. This sug-
gests that participants are more likely to update their estimations
when the information is desirable than when it is undesirable
(Figure 5A), a conclusion that is obviously wrong since no feed-
back was actually presented.
In order to control for the RTM effect, we selected a subset
of events that were matched with participants’ initial estima-
tions between desirable condition and undesirable condition.
For each participant, events with initial estimations that were
smaller than 13% in the undesirable condition and events with
initial estimations that were larger than 77% in the desirable
condition were excluded. Difference between participants’ initial
www.frontiersin.org January 2015 | Volume 5 | Article 1574 | 5
Yu and Chen The need to control for regression to the mean
FIGURE 4 | Experimental task design in study 2. (A) During each trial of
the initial estimation session, one of 80 adverse life events was presented
and participant estimated the likelihood of experiencing the event. The initial
estimation was shown under “My risk.” Finally, participants were told that
the average probability of that event occurring to people from background
similar to them was displayed in black font under “Average risk.” For each
event, the difference between “My risk” and “Average risk” was calculated
as estimation error. (B) In the re-estimation session, participants estimated
these 80 adverse life events again. For each event, the difference between
the initial estimation and re-estimation was calculated as update.
FIGURE 5 | Unrealistic optimism effect in study 2. (A) Absolute update in
mean-corrected estimations after 30min (|mean-corrected 30-min
re-estimation - the mean-corrected initial estimation|) as a function of
conditions (desirable information vs. undesirable information). (B) Absolute
update in mean-corrected estimations after 30min as a function of conditions.
The results were from subsets of events with initial estimations matched
between the desirable information and undesirable information conditions, to
control for regression to the mean. Error bars indicate standard error.
estimations in the desirable and undesirable conditions was not
significant, t(14) = −0.547, p = 0.593. The average number of tri-
als in the desirable and undesirable conditions was 22.87 (SD
= 8.03) and 29.67 (SD = 9.64), respectively. The difference in
absolute update between the conditions providing desirable and
undesirable information was not significant t(14) = 0.016, p =
0.988, indicating that participants updated their estimation in the
desirable information condition as much as in the condition of
undesirable information (Figure 5B).
Using regression analysis, estimation error (Average Risk -
Initial Estimation) was the independent variable while update
between the two sessions was the dependent variable. The coef-
ficient for estimation error was significant with RTM not con-
trolled (beta = 0.318, p < 0.001). However, after initial estima-
tion was used as an additional independent variable, estimation
error no longer significantly predicted update scores from the 30-
min retest (beta = 0.07, p > 0.05). Thus, there was no evidence
of an unrealistic optimism effect after RTM was controlled.
DISCUSSION
As is common in social psychological research, earlier studies
on the social conformity effect and the unrealistic optimism
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effect have relied on repeated measurements but have not fully
controlled for the effects of RTM. In the current studies we
demonstrated that the social conformity effect and unrealistic
optimism effect were remarkable before controlling for RTM
but were no longer apparent after controlling for RTM. Overall,
our findings support the conclusions that the social conformity
effect and unrealistic optimism effect can be confounded by the
RTM effect if it is not controlled; to ensure valid conclusions,
it is essential to control for the RTM effect in social psychology
studies.
Our results are consistent with those of a recent longitudinal
study on social conformity (Huang et al., 2014). In the Huang
et al. study, a facial-attractiveness rating task was used and par-
ticipants were asked to rate each face; they were then informed of
the rating of a peer group; finally, they were called back to rate the
same faces after 1, 3, or 7 days or 3 months. Their results demon-
strated the importance of controlling for the RTM effect, as the
social-conformity effect at the 3months interval disappeared after
RTMwas controlled. Our study took this line of research one step
forward. Firstly, our results showed that the RTM effect can con-
found the social conformity effect even when participants are not
presented challenging information. Different from Huang et al.’s
study, no challenging information was presented to participants
and that means participants rated the same faces twice without
any outside influence from experimental conditions. Therefore,
any change between the two ratings should be attributed to
the inside statistical problem of RTM caused by random error
and extreme ratings. Secondly, the results of our study showed
that an effect other than social conformity—namely, unrealis-
tic optimism—was also confounded by RTM. This is important
because no other study to date has attended to RTM in the study
of unrealistic optimism. Finally, the most important point is that
our findings challenge the conclusions made based on previous
studies on social conformity and unrealistic optimism. In other
words, it is likely that previous studies suffered from the RTM
effect and those results were affected by it. Using an inert treat-
ment (no feedback), we demonstrated a significant RTM effect
which is analogous to the “placebo” effect in medicine. It is worth
mentioning that our findings cannot be taken as evidence that the
conformity effect and the unrealistic optimism effect examined
using the test–retest paradigms are completely an artifact. Our
studies differ from previous studies in many ways, including the
stimuli used, the experimental parameters, culture background
of participants, and so on. Moreover, there was no actual feed-
back provided to participants. The ambiguity induced by the
lack of information may also make participants feel less confi-
dent about their ratings and thus make changes more frequently.
Nevertheless, our study does suggest that the observed effects
might be exaggerated if the RTM effect is not well-controlled
and can be mistakenly taken as part of, if not the whole of, the
psychological effect the researchers intend to examine.
Our findings also highlight the need to identify methods to
control for the RTM effect in future studies of social conformity
and unrealistic optimism and in the larger domain of social psy-
chology research. As the expected change (or update) due to RTM
can be mistaken for a real change (or update), it is indispensable
to find ways to control for the RTM effect in order to obtain
accurate results. First of all, recognizing and understanding the
RTM effect is the foundation of controlling for it (Morton and
Torgerson, 2005). Several methods can be applied to control for
RTM. At the very least, the RTM effect should be quantified using
the formula provided in previous research (Gardner and Heady,
1973; Davis, 1976; Barnett et al., 2005) that has highlighted
the contribution of both within-subject variance and between-
subject variance to RTM. However, this formula is not suitable
for non-normally distributed data (James, 1973; McDonald et al.,
1983). An even better approach to control for RTM would be to
use a control group combined with random allocation of subjects
at the study design stage (Whitney and Von Korff, 1992; Barnett
et al., 2005). With random assignment, scores in both groups
should be equally affected by RTM and the difference in mean
change between the two groups should be attributable solely to
the effects of the experimental manipulation (see Figure 1B, right
panel).
The quantification of the RTM effect and the use of a con-
trol group can offer great protection against RTM, but RTM
cannot be controlled sufficiently when extreme initial values are
not excluded. As the initial value is more extreme, the expected
change in the follow-up score will be greater, thus increasing
the likelihood of RTM (Linden, 2013). Our present studies pro-
vide an ideal method to fully control for RTM by eliminating
the impact of extreme initial values. Specifically, extreme val-
ues in the initial session were excluded so as to make sure that
participants’ initial ratings or estimations did not differ signif-
icantly across experimental conditions (p > 0.20) (Zaki et al.,
2011; Huang et al., 2014). Thus, ratings or estimations in differ-
ent conditions suffered from random error (and thus RTM) to
the same degree. Therefore, RTM can be controlled sufficiently
and the difference in change between different conditions can be
attributed to the experimental effects. Here, we present evidence
that experimental effects in two separate studies became statis-
tically non-significant after eliminating the impact of extreme
values in the first measurement. One disadvantage of using a
subset of matched trials is that it reduces statistical power. The
regression analysis which uses the complete dataset can also
examine the effect of initial rating and feedback information.
The results were confirmed by regression analysis conducted in
both studies. In Study 1, the degree of conflict (group rating
- participants’ initial rating) served as the independent variable
and rating change (re-rating – initial rating) was the depen-
dent variable in the regression model. Then, to control for
RTM, initial rating was included as another independent vari-
able. The results showed that conflict could not significantly
predict the change in scores after RTM was controlled. Similar
results were obtained in the regression analysis conducted in
Study 2. Thus, our findings demonstrate that eliminating the
impact of extreme values is a successful method to fully control
for RTM.
In conclusion, this is the first study in social psychology to
provide an adequate test of RTM effect in absence of any feed-
back. Because insufficient control of RTM could lead to erroneous
conclusions, social psychological researchers should pay more
attention to the RTM effect in repeated measurements and adopt
appropriate ways to control for it.
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